Should a rm favor a weaker or stronger employee in a contest? Despite a widespread emphasis on rewarding the best employees, managers continue to tolerate and even favor poor performers. Contest theory reveals that evenly matched contests are the most intense, which implies that a contest designer can maximize each player's eort by articially boosting the underdog's chances. We apply this type of handicapping to a two-period repeated contest between employees, in which the only information available about their abilities is their performance in the rst-period. In this setting, employees are strategic and forward looking, such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the rst-period contest result on the second period contest, and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly. The manager also incorporates these strategic behaviors of employees when determining an optimal handicapping policy. If employees' abilities are suciently dierent, favoring the rst-period loser in the second period increases total eort over both periods. However, if abilities are suciently similar, we nd the opposite result occurs: total eort increases most in response to a handicapping strategy of favoring the rst-period winner.
Introduction
Given their limited resources, rms often face a tough decision about whether to invest in laggards or reward their top performers to motivate their employees. This fundamental question in management still does not have gained a consensus answer. Many experts recommend that managers should reward their top employees and avoid coddling weaker employees with lower standards; for example, top sales agents often receive more training and obtain more back-oce resources (Farrell and Hakstian 2001) . Indeed, $1.3 billion in training expenses are devoted to grooming leaders, and managers are often told to look for top performers to receive specialized learning opportunities (Kranz 2007 ). However, more than 60% of employees surveyed indicated that their managers tolerate poor performers implying that top performers were not being recognized ( To address the issue of whether a rm should favor weaker or stronger employees, we adopt a contest theory approach. Managers often reward employees based on overall evaluations over a certain period of time, rather than on a narrowly dened sales contest, (which is a short-term temporary monetary incentive program for salespeople). In this study, we refer to this entire evaluation time period as the contest. As such, we broadly dene a contest as any competition between employees, including competition for limited support, resources or promotion to higher ranks. We refer to several reward systems rms use to motivate and encourage employees to expend their eorts such as monetary bonuses, promotions or more subtle forms of various privileges as the contest prize.
Contests typically involve two or more employees competing for a single prize, and the employee who performs best usually wins (i.e., winner-take-all contest). By adding this winner-take-all component, rms can induce a signicant increase in eort. However, the eect is unclear when a manager faces heterogeneous employees who dier in their abilities. Weaker employees often recognize their small chance of winning and thus have little motivation to increase their eort (Hart et al. 1989 , Murphy et al. 2004 , Corsun et al. 2006 ). Consequently, stronger employees, anticipating less competition, also may respond with limited changes to their behavior or even lower eort. In this case, the contest fails to properly motivate the employees or meet the goals of the manager.
Previous research in economics and marketing suggests guidelines for contests. For example, contest theory suggests leveling the playing eld by granting an advantage (which is also called handicapping in the contest literature) to a weaker employee, which may increase overall eort (Lazear and Rosen 1981 , Baik 1994 , Baye et al. 1993 , Liu et al. 2007 ). The advantage increases the weaker employee's chances of success, similar to giving a weaker golfer a handicap , which should make the contest more intense.
1 Therefore, helping the weaker employee can make all employees compete harder to win the contest.
However, in practice, some contests actually favor the stronger employees. For example, successful sales agents often receive more lucrative territories or product lines (Skiera and Albers 1998) , are assigned less administrative responsibilities, obtain more back-oce resources, or have more training (Krishnamoorthy et (Mastromarco and Runkel 2006) . Similarly, by winning previous contests, wellestablished rms and incumbent politicians often enjoy easier runs in subsequent contests.
In most cases, such favoring the winner over the loser seems to contradict the principle of maximizing eort by evening the playing eld.
We note that these existing models (for example, Lazear and Rosen 1981, Baik 1994, Baye et al. 1993 ) assume that the contest designer can perfectly distinguish between high and low ability employees. However, most managers in reality face uncertainty about their employees' abilities in dynamic settings whereby a prior round of the contest is both a source of prot for the rm and the source of information about the relative strength of the employees. Therefore, managers can base their assessment, in part, on employees' past performances in previous periods. Past performance clearly oers a strong, albeit noisy, signal of ability.
In this article, we consider a two-period repeated contests (Amaldoss and Rapoport 2009 ) with uncertainty where the contest designer (i.e., manager) faces heterogeneous employees but does not know the exact abilities of each individual employee. The manager only receives a noisy signal of employees' abilities through rst-period contest results. In the second-period contest, the manager can assign a handicap to favor the winner or loser of the previous contest. However, in a dynamic setting where the two contests are linked through the handicapping policy, this handicapping policy might create a new incentive problem. For example, if employees anticipate that winning a current contest will hurt them in the future, they have less incentive to win the rst contest. Favoring the loser of the rst contest thus creates an incentive problem of ratcheting in which both players reduce their attempts to win in the rst period so they can take 1 We use the paradoxical terminology of handicapping, as popularized by its usage in association with golf, which implies that a higher handicap helps a player.
advantage of second-period handicapping. On the other hand, favoring the winner of the rst contest would also create another type of incentive problem of moral hazard, because the winner no longer has to work as hard in the second contest. The manager should weigh the trade-os of these two dierent policies (favoring the winner vs. favoring the loser) to maximize the employees' total eort.
Here, we adopt a Tullock (1980) contest model, which uses the standard ratio-form contest success function. The model clearly demonstrates that employees' incentives change over time with dierent handicapping policies (i.e., favoring weaker vs. stronger employees) and fully considers the strategic eects of the employees (i.e., ratcheting vs moral hazard).
In particular, if abilities are suciently similar, surprisingly favoring the rst-period winner in the second period increases total eort over both periods rewarding the top performer is optimal. However, if abilities are suciently dierent, the opposite result holds, and total eort is maximized by adopting a handicapping policy that favors the rst-period loser investing in laggards is optimal. As such, the model suggests a clear handicapping policy guideline for the manager when faced with a heterogenous workforce with uncertain abilities in a dynamic contest environment. We use this contest model and its handicapping policy as an analogy to understand the rm's fundamental dilemma of when a rm should favor weaker or stronger employees to motivate all employees.
More specically, we rst nd that when employees are suciently dierent in their abilities, the standard handicapping policy of favoring the loser of the rst period is optimal.
Even though rewarding the loser in the second period decreases the total rst period eort due to the ratcheting eect, the employees' strategic considerations for the second period handicap overcomes this eort loss in the rst period. This is because rewarding the loser in the second period reduces the stronger employee's rst period incentives more than it reduces the weak employees's rst period incentives. In this way, the rst period contest becomes more equitable through the handicapping policy of favoring the loser. This mitigates the negative impact on total rst period eort for very large ability dierences.
On the other hand, when employees' abilities are suciently similar, we nd that favoring the winner of the rst period contest is optimal. With little dierence in their abilities, the extent of advantage the winner of the rst contest receives is also small. Accordingly, the loser of the rst period contest still has a fair chance to win the second period contest even with a small disadvantage, and thus experiences sucient incentive to exert eort. Hence, the increase in eort in the rst period due to the future rewards for winning outweighs the eort loss in the second period when employees' abilities are suciently similar.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Sections 2 describes the related literature. Section 3 presents our main model of dynamic contest and its analysis. We also provide extensions to our model in Section 4, and we conclude in Section 5.
Literature Review
The theoretical foundations of contests stem from the economics literature. Since Tullock (1980) published his seminal contest model in which players vie for a single prize through the expenditure of their resources (sometimes called a Tullock or ratio-form contest), several models have been proposed for dierent types of contests (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Moldovanu and Sela 2001) . In particular, we follow Meyer (1991 Meyer ( , 1992 to determine how the uncertainty about employee types aects a manager's handicapping policy. Meyer (1991, 1992 ) analyzes a multi-period contest using a Lazear-Rosen (1981) dierence-form contest, in which success is a function of the dierence in (ability-adjusted) eort levels.
The Lazear-Rosen (1981) model diers from most models in the contest literature, in that (1) it does not follow the standard Tullock contest form (which uses the ratio-form success function) and (2) it does not use a linear cost function for eort. In our model, we instead adopt the standard Tullock contest model and attain pure strategy equilibria where both sides exert eort. This is not possible in dierence-form asymmetric contests with nonlinear costs (Hirshleifer 1989 , Baik 2004 ).
In this sense, our study extends the robustness of Meyer's (1992) results of symmetric case to a Tullock (1980) ratio-form contest and uncovers new results in the asymmetric case.
Meyer (1992) shows that in a promotion setting, giving an advantage to the winner increases overall eort (or equivalently minimizes the cost of prizes to induce the same eort). This result is, however, limited to only the symmetric players case, and we extend it to investigate the incentive problem in a two-period repeated contests between two asymmetric employees (i.e., individuals with dierent abilities) who strategically choose their eorts in response to the handicapping policy. In Meyer (1991) , she analyze the asymmetric players under uncertainty, but the incentive eects of handicapping, which is the main focus of this paper, are ignored because employees do not make any stratgic decisions in her model. In contrast, we focus on the incentives costs and benets from the dierent handicapping policy under uncertainty with asymmetric players.
The model of contests has been extensively applied in various contexts outside of sales contests. For example, Tsoulouhas et al. (2007) use a context model to study the issue of employee promotion selection and show when it is optimal to handicap insiders or outsiders for CEO selection. Horsky et al. (2010) investigate the advertising agency selection problem using a contest model and Harbaugh and Ridlon (2010) apply the contest model to the all-pay auction setting. In particular, Harbaugh and Ridlon (2010) have a similar theme and structure with the current model in that both investigate the issue of optimal handicapping policy between asymmetric players in a two-period contest setting. However, unlike Harbaugh and Ridlon (2010) who only nds support for favoring the loser for all ability dierences (i.e., the handicapping policy of rewarding the loser always maximizes total bids in the all-pay auction setting), our model clearly identies the conditions in which favoring the winner could be optimal. Furthermore, the bid equilibrium in Harbaugh and Ridlon (2010) can only be found in mixed strategies which are not realistic in most con-test settings. Our model overcomes this inconsistency of a mixed strategy equilibrium and provides richer results as they relate to competition between asymmetric employees. Also, Laont and Tirole (1988) study whether to favor the incumbent in a regulated market and nd that the auction should be biased in favor of the new entrant. On the other hand, Burguet and Che (2004) examine the optimal scoring system in multi-attribute procurement auctions and nd that in the presence of corruption, handicapping the ecient rm is not optimal and exacerbates the inecient allocation due to bribery. The optimal scoring rule for the buyer may even favor the ecient rm. Our paper can contribute to this scoring auction literature by identifying the conditions when it is optimal to favor the weaker or stronger bidder in a dynamic setting. In marketing, most theoretical research focuses on the issue of optimal contest design. Kalra and Shi (2001) is the rst paper to have examined sales contests from a game theoretical perspective. They identify specic conditions in which the optimal contest design structure should include multiple prizes at varying levels to induce greater eort by all salespeople. Krishna and Morgan (1998) further show that winner-take-all contests are optimal when contestants are risk-neutral. Lim (2010) uses a behavioral economics model to demonstrate that a contest with a higher proportion of winners than losers can yield greater eort than one with fewer winners under certain conditions. Finally, Chen et al. In contrast, we do not address the issue of optimal structure of contests or prize amount.
3 Harbaugh and Ridlon (2010) examines the auction setting where the expected payo to the weaker player is zero and, therefore, there is no strategic eect of the handicapping policy on the weaker player in the rst period (since his payo cannot be lower than zero). Hence, their model does not fully incorporate the tension between two dierent incentives problems (ratcheting vs moral hazard) created by dierent handicapping policies, which is the focus of the current paper. Thus, their model cannot nd the pure strategy equilibrium or the conditions under which favoring the winner can be optimal.
Instead, our focus is on nding the optimal handicapping policy (whether to reward the loser or winner) taking the common winner-take-all structures (Krishna and Morgan, 1998) and prizes as given. This will give us insight for answering management's fundamental dilemma whether to favor the stronger or weaker employees.
Model
Before we analyze our main model of two periods repeated contests, we look at the case of one-period static contest, where we summarize the standard results in contest literature.
These results serve as a baseline for our main model analysis.
3.1
Benchmark: One-Period Static Case
In this benchmark case, we consider a simple one-period contest between two employees A and B. We assume that eorts are unobservable by the manager, who only identies a winner of the contest. The ability parameters directly inuence the eectiveness of converting eort into performance. Thus, higher ability leads to higher performance, all else being equal.
The probability of A winning the contest is his eort relative to the total eort of both A and B. We specify employee A's contest success probability (s A ) by following the standard Tullock (1980) ratio form contest success function
where ∂s A /∂e A > 0 and ∂ 2 s A /∂e 2 A < 0 for all e A , such that extra eort by player A increases his probability of winning at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, the probability of winning decreases with his rival's eort while the ability parameter increases the probability of success as it becomes greater. In other words, as employee A becomes stronger, the more likely he is to win the prize. 
Similarly, employee B's utility function is 
where ∂e i ∂v i > 0 and ∂e i ∂σ > 0 for all i ∈ {A, B}, such that equilibrium eorts increase in their own valuation of the prize (v i ) and the relative ability σ.
We can immediately see that the ratio of eorts
is equal to the ratio of valuations
. In particular, when valuations are identical (v A = v B ), the equilibrium levels of eorts are identical, regardless of ability dierences (i.e., e * A = e * B ). At the same time, equilibrium eort levels depend on ability dierences, and increase as ability dierences become smaller (i.e., σ becomes greater). This captures the intuition that evenly matched contest is most intense. These are standard Tullock contest results found in the literature (for example,
Baik 1994 and Nti 1999).
We assume that the rm (manager) can treat employees dierently by favoring or granting an advantage to a particular employee, which aects the outcome of the contest. We call this artical bias a handicapping policy. This handicapping policy can take several forms in practice: for example, employees can be assigned to dierent environments or product lines (Skiera and Albers 1998), or given dierent amounts of training, or back-oce resources (Krishnamoorthy et al. 2005 , Meyer 1992 ).
Let h be the handicapping policy. The handicap, h ≥ 0, has a multiplicative eect on the ability parameter σ = a A a B such that the relative ability now becomes hσ. When h > 1, the rm favors the weaker employee and handicapping reduces asymmetry. When h < 1, the rm favors the stronger employee and thus, handicapping amplies the asymmetry. For simplicity, we assume that heterogeneity only appears in ability, and valuations are set to
The second-order suciency condition for A (and B),
(e B +σe A ) 3 vA < 0, holds 6 Employee heterogeneity can be expressed in terms of cost of eort, prize valuation, and ability. We assume these costs and valuations are constant between players and allows only for ability to dier. See
Recall that equilibrium eort levels are the same when valuations are identical regardless of ability asymmetry. From Equations (3), we express total eort as
The objective of the manager in our setting is to maximize the total employee eorts e T otal . 7
Because any asymmetry between players reduces total contest eort, the manager has an incentive to make the contest more equitable by giving an advantage to the weaker player.
When the manager knows the abilities of the employees (perfect infomration case), the optimal policy is to favor the weaker employee by the exact reciprocal amount of the ability dierence, h * = 1 σ , equalizing the two employees' abilities. Not surprisingly, this maximizes total eort, such that it is equal to total eort when employees are symmetric. This is a well-known result from Tullock (1980) .
However, in practice, the manager does not necessarily have perfect information about the identities of the stronger and weaker employees. The manager may have a good sense of his employee pool (hence, knows the distribution of abilities), but does not know the exact location of each individual on the distribution.
8 For example, in hiring new employees, the rm has expectations of performance from stronger and poor performers given his emplyee pool (thus, their ability dierence σ), but cannot determine the identity of the weaker or stronger employee.
9 In this case, closing the ability gap by favoring one of the players might reduce total eort if it is erroneously appled to the stronger player, further increasing the ability disparity.
In practice though, managers receive multiple noisy signals about employees' abilities, such as their absenteeism, project completion, and prior performance evaluations or previous contest results. The manager receives such a noisy singal γ about employees' relative abilities. This signal is incorrect with probability p and correct with probability (1 − p).
In other words, with probability p, employee A (B) is incorrectly identied as stronger Baye and Hoppe (2003) for a discussion of the strategic equivalence of contests with asymmetric costs, valuations, and abilities.
7 Although we leave the rm's objective in this reduced form for now, we later formally show micro-model of this reduced form, in which we show that the manager only needs to nd the optimal h that maximizes the total employee eorts.
(weaker), and with probability (1 − p) , employee A (B) is correctly identied as the weaker (stronger) employee.
Proposition 1 When a singal γ is sucinetly informative (i.e., p is suciently small), a handicapping policy that favors the perceived weaker employee (h * > 1) is optimal for all ability dierences (σ < 1). Moreover, this optimal handicapping policy is strictly smaller than
Proof. See the Appendix.
In a static contest, the optimal handicapping policy under uncertainty is to favor the perceived weaker employee. However, this handicapping policy does not fully compensate the ability dierence due to the uncertainty. This is dierent from the perfect information case, where the handicapping policy precisely equalizes the two employees' abilities by fully compensating the exact amount of ability dierence (
Dynamic Model
In this section, we extend the static benchmark model to the case of a two-period repeated game, and explicitly model the source of noisy information γ as the result of a rst-period contest; that is, as the endogenous outcome of a game between strategic, forward-looking employees.
Suppose now that the manager observes a two-period repeated contests of prize v for each period, such that the value of the prize does not vary between periods, v 1 = v 2 = v. By keeping the values of each contest the same, we can focus on the direct eect of h on the equilibrium outcome. Prior to the rst-period contest, the manager commits to a handicapping policy h, which is observable to the employees. In practice, rms explicitly proclaim the way a winner is selected with well-dened criteria as well as a publicized benet for the winner or the loser in the future. In the rst period, the employees compete in a contest, and the manager gains information about the employees' relative abilities by observing who wins or loses. This signal is still noisy because the success function, or winning probability, of the rst period contest is stochastic (see Equation (1)) and more importantly, employees may strategically adjust their behaviors. Using the information about who wins the contest in the rst period, the manager assesses, with some probability, who is weaker or stronger and assigns the pre-determined h for the second-period contest.
Hence, the manager treats the result of the rst period contest as the signal about employees' relative abilities.
Here, employees are strategic and forward looking, such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the rst period contest result on the second period contest, and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly. The manager also considers the employees' strategic behaviors when determining an optimal handicapping policy.
Second Period
We start by considering the second period. Instead of receiving an exogenous signal γ with uncertainty p, the manager receives the endogenous signal from the rst period contest as a win or loss, with probability equal to the rst period success function. As we see from the benchmark, the second-period equilibrium eorts of both employees are identical since
However, given the handicapping policy h, the exact level of eort depends on which employee won the rst period contest.
The impact of handicapping policy h on the ability gap is either σh, if the handicap is correctly applied to the weaker employee, or Hence, if the weaker employee A wins the contest in the rst period, he is believed (incorrectly) to be the stronger employee, and the handicap is erroneously applied to the truly stronger employee. In this case, we can nd the equilibrium second period eorts from Equation (3). The equilibrium eort in the second period will be
Again, both employees exert the same amount of eort e f in equilibrium since the valuation for the contest is the same (i.e., v A = v B = v). The superscript`f ' represents their`false' identity.
But, if employee A loses the contest in the rst period, he will be correctly identied as the weaker employee and receive a handicap of h. Equilibrium levels of eort for both employees in the second period are hence,
where the superscript`t' represents their`true' identity.
To calculate the second period success function, we insert these equilibrium eorts into Equation (1). Thus, the second period success functions for employee A are conditional on the outcome of the rst period contest. If A loses (L) in the rst period (and thus, equilibrium eort is e t = σh (1+σh) 2 v), the contest success function for employee A is s A|L = Pr (A wins | A loses rst period contest) = σh 1 + σh .
If he wins (W ) in the rst period (and thus, equilibrium eort is e f = σh (σ+h) 2 v), the contest success function for employee A is
Employees A's and B's second period expected utilities are, respectively,
where s A is the probability that employee A wins in the rst period contest (s A = σe A σe A +e B from Equation (1)).
First Period Now, we turn to the rst period utility to understand the employees' optimal eort decisions.
Since employees are strategic and forward-looking, they incorporate the fact that their rst period eorts not only aect their current rst period utility but also future second period utility. Thus, employee A chooses an eort level in the rst period that maximizes his total expected utility:
where δ is the discount factor, which we normalize to 1 for simplicity. The rst-order condition is 11
11 It is easy to check that the second-order condition,
where
Here, ω A captures employee A's implicit value of winning the rst period contest. The rst term (v) represents the utility from the rst period contest, and the second
and third s A|L v − e t 2 terms represent the extra future value (or cost) of winning the rst period contest, depending on σ and h.
Similarly, the rst-order condition for maximizing employee B's total utility function is
Here, ω B represents employee B's implicit value of winning the rst period contest.
From Equations (11) and (12), we nd that rst period equilibrium eorts are
As a result, the probability of employee A winning the rst period contest is simply
Note that the implicit valuations in the rst period, ω A and ω B , are independent of rst period eorts (e A , e B ). That is, they are treated as exogenous prizes just as in the static, single-period contest case. However, a change in handicapping policy h (whether to favor the winner or loser of the rst period contest as well as how much benet or favor to give) aects the eort levels of both employees in the rst period by either increasing or decreasing the implicit value of winning in the rst period (ω A , ω B ). This is the strategic eect of h on the rst period eorts.
The following proposition shows how dierently a handicapping policy aects the implicit value of winning in the rst period for dierent employees, which ultimately aects their eort levels. 2. Under a handicapping policy of favoring the winner (i.e., when h < 1), the value of winning the rst-period contest is such that ω B > ω A > v.
3. Without a handicapping policy (i.e., h = 1), the value of winning the rst-period contest converges to the static single-period case for both employees:
The proposition basically suggests that when h becomes larger (i.e., the manager favors the loser of the rst period more), the value of winning the rst period decreases for both employees (
∂h < 0) since the loser can benet in the second period from the handicapping policy h. This is the strategic eect of h due to the dynamic relationship between two-period contests. What is more interesting and surprising is that the value for the stronger employee is greater or smaller than that of the weaker employee depending on the handicapping policy (i.e. whether h < 1 or h > 1). Figure 1 illustrates this relationship between the handicapping policy (h) and the value of winning the rst period contest (when σ = 0.5).
When the rm faovrs the loser (i.e., h > 1), it reduces the value of winning the rst period contest due to the future punishment for current success: ω A < v and ω B < v.
Because of this, both employees may modify their eorts by holding back in the rst period.
This dynamic arises from the ratchet eect identied in previous literature (Freixas et al. 1985 , Weitzman 1980 . Moreover, this decrease in value is greater for the stronger employee who is more likely to win the current contest and thus, ω B < ω A < v for h > 1.
On the other hand, when the rm favors the winner (h < 1), the value of winning the rst-period contest is higher than the static single-period case due to the future rewards for the current success: ω A > v, ω B > v for h < 1. More importantly, the value of winning for the stronger employee is greater than that of the weaker employee when h < 1. This is because the stronger employee B benets more from the increased asymmetry in the second period contest while the weaker employee A is still more likely to lose even with advantage since the handicapping does not fully compensate the ability dierence due to the uncertainty (see Proposition 1). Hence, employee B would value winning the rst period contest more than employee A (ω A < ω B ).
The implicit value of winning varies for each employee under dierent handicapping policies and thus aects their eort levels dierently. From Equation (13), it is clear that the direct eect of its own implicit value of winning is to increase the rst period eort:
> 0. The higher the stake, the more they exert their eort.
However, changes in rivals' eorts are more ambiguous. The indirect eect of implicit value of winning for employee A (B) on the eort of employee B (A) is not necessarily monotonic:
The following proposition summarizes these indirect eects of the implicit value of winning on the eort of the other competitor with dierent handicapping policies, which is the key factor that drives our main results of optimal handicapping choice in the next section. ). This result stems from the fact that the increased eort from the stronger player due to the increase in the valuation of winning ω B , makes the rst period contest even more asymmetric such that weaker player (employee A) has very little chance of winning. In this case, the weaker player simply reduce its eort cost in the rst period.
On the other hand, when employees' abilities are similar (σ ≥
In other words, the weaker employee has a fair chance of winning the contest when employees' abilities are similar and thus, tries to match his rival in the contest. However, the stronger employee, B, now nds it optimal to reduce his eort cost in the rst period and tries to benet from the handicapping policy of favoring the loser in the second period, which makes the contest even more asymmetric.
In addition, a handicapping policy of favoring the winner (h < 1) increases both players' valuations for winning the rst period contest. An increase in ω A causes employee B to raise his eort ( Inasmuch as what these eects have on overall eort remains to be seen in the next section.
3.3
Optimal Handicapping Policy: Favoring the Loser or Winner
In the previous section, we showed that favoring the winner (h < 1) has the direct eect of increasing the valuation of winning the rst period (ω A , ω B ), leading to higher total eorts in the rst period, but it also has a separate and unique indirect eect on each employee's eort (
. Furthermore, favoring the winner may increase the ability gap in the second period, lowering total eorts in the second period. The manager should consider all three eects when she chooses the optimal handicapping policy.
Let e T otal 1 and e T otal 2 be the total eorts of the rst and second period, respectively. Given a handicapping policy h and ability dierence σ, the total expected equilibrium eort for both periods is
Recall that since employees' valuations are identical in the second period, their equilibrium eorts in that period are also the same; if employee A wins in the rst period (with probability s A ), the equilibrium eort is e f 2 for both employees, whereas if he loses in the rst period (with probability 1 − s A ), it is e t 2 .
The objective of the manager is to maximize rm's prot which is a function of total employee eort π M = ψ · e T otal − C(v), where ψ is the parameter that captures the rm's product eciecy and C(v) is the cost for prize v.
Here, the contest prize clearly aects the equilibrium eort levels and thus, when the manager designs the contest in practice, she should optimize not only the handicapping policy h, but also the contest prize amount v. However, all ω A , ω B are linear func-
, and thus, the rst period eort e A1 and e B1 are also linear functions of v (e A1 (ω A , ω B , σ) =
) is independent of v, and therefore, the second period expected eorts (s A · 2 · e
2 ) is again a linear functions of v. Therefore, once we dene e T as the total eort when v = 1, the rm's prot function can be re-written as π M = v · ψ · e T (h, σ) − C(v). This implies that the choice of optimal handicapping policy h is independent of contest prize v. Hence, to maximize the prot, the manager only needs to nd the optimal h that maximizes the total employee eorts for any given v. In other words, for any given level of contest prize, our result of handicapping policy is always optimal and thus, the objective of the manager reverts to nding optimal h irrespective of the value of v. 12 Also, we note that h aects employees' implicit valuations in the rst period through ω A and ω B . Given a manager's handicapping policy in the second period, employees choose their eorts in the rst period, fully anticipating the consequence of their choices in the second period. Proposition 4 For any given v > 0, when employee abilities are very dierent (σ is suciently small), a handicap policy of favoring the loser (h > 1) maximizes the expected total eort. Otherwise, when employee abilities are similar (σ is suciently large), a handicap policy of favoring the winner (h < 1) maximizes total eort.
There is a fundamental trade-o between the eort levels across two periods when the manager employs a handicapping policy. On the one hand, a handicapping policy of favoring the loser (h > 1) always increases eort in the second period because it levels the playing eld and encourages the weaker player. Yet favoring the loser reduces the incentives of players to win the rst period contest due to the future punishment for the winner, tempering the gains from the second period.
On the other hand, a handicapping policy of favoring the winner (h < 1) always increases eort in the rst period because of the additional future reward for the winner in the second period. However, this reduces eort in the second period because the winner of the rst contest would no longer need to work as hard in the second period, tempering the gains from the rst period.
Overall, the manager must balance these trade-os when choosing a handicapping strategy. When employees are very dierent in their abilities (i.e., small σ), the handicapping policy of favoring the loser (h > 1) can intensify competition between employees in the second period, and this benet of increased eort outweighs the loss of eort in the rst period. Both employees reduce eort in the rst period to take advantage of future benet, but employees do not race to the bottom due to the strategic indirect eect of the weaker employee A ( ∂e A ∂ω B < 0 from Proposition 3). The value to stronger employee B decreases signicantly (i.e., ω B < ω A < v from Proposition 2), thus lowering his rst period eort.
This has an indirect eect on the weaker employee's eort since he now has a higher chance to win the rst period contest against a more restrained stronger employee and thus, increases his eort. This mitigates the loss in total rst period eort for the manager. This only occurs when employees are very dierent in their abilities (i.e., small σ), and in this case, favoring the loser (h > 1) maximizes expected total eort.
In contrast, when employee abilities are very similar (i.e., large σ), the cost in lost eort associated with the handicapping policy of favoring the loser (h > 1) is greater.
12 The optimal prize v clearly aects the incentives of the agents by steepening or moderating the eorts.
The optimal v can be found as C (v * ) = e T and thus, it is independnet of h and it only depends on the specication of cost function C(v). For example, if we impose a convex cost of C(v) = Again, the value for winning the rst period contest decreases for both employees A and B, reducing their eorts. Unlike the case when σ is small (or employees are very dierent), the indirect strategic eect of the reduced implicit value causes the weaker employee to further reduce his eort (
> 0 from Proposition 3) instigating a true race to the bottom . Note that this indirect eect is greater than the indirect strategic eect on employee B since ω B < ω A < v (i.e.,
). Furthermore, since the abilities are similar, any advantage from the handicap policy would only marginally improve eort in the second period. Therefore, when employee abilities are very similar, a handicapping policy in favor of the loser (h > 1) cannot be advantageous for the manager.
A handicapping policy in favor of the winner (h < 1), on the other hand, motivates employees to compete more intensely in the rst period, outweighing the costs of lackluster performance in the second period. In other words, the potential incentive problem of moral hazard from favoring the winner is not severe when players are very similar in their abilities.
Even with a small advantage to the winner, the loser still has sucient incentive to exert eort in the second period contest. In anticipation of such eort, the stronger player still responds to the contest with suciently high eort level in the second period. Hence, when the ability dierence is small (i.e., σ is suciently large), the cost of eort loss in the second period is more than compensated by the increased eort in the rst period favoring the winner (h < 1) maximizes the expected total eort. For example, when employees are identical in ability, σ = 1, the total expected eort is
2 , which is maximized by a handicap policy of favoring the winner h = . This is in stark contrast to the static case, where favoring the perceived weaker player (h > 1) is always optimal for all ability dierences. In contrast, in a dynamic setting, the manager someitmes maximizes the total eort by favoring the perceived stronger player who wins the rst period contest. By increasing the incentives in the rst period contest through the future rewards for the rst period contest success, the manager can maximize the total eorts from both employees. This only arises from the dynamic incentives created by the handicapping policy and hence, in the static case, we could not nd the situation where favoring the perceived stronger player optimal.
We illustrate the relationship between the relative ability σ and the optimal handicapping policy h in Figure 2 -(a) below, when v = 1. This clearly demonstrates that favoring the winner (h < 1) is benecial to the manager's attempt to raise eort when employees are similar in their abilities (in this particular example, when σ > 0.36). Favoring the loser (h > 1) is benecial only when employees are suciently dierent in their abilities (when σ < 0.36).
Next, we investigate the relationship between the relative ability σ and the expected total eort from both periods E(e T otal ) under the optimal handicapping policy h * . As Figure 2-(b) shows, the expected total eort E(e T otal ) under the optimal policy h * is always greater than the expected total eort without any handicapping policy (i.e., h = 1 for all σ). To better understand the underlying forces behind this result, we decompose the total eort into individual eort by period, as shown in Figure 3 . First, we note that there is a single crossover between the rst and second period eort at the point where the optimal handicapping policy is h = 1 (in this particular case , σ = 0.36). A handicapping policy of h = 1 is equivalent to the case of a no handicapping policy (or static contest case).
Hence, eort levels from both the rst and the second periods are identical. Second, Figure   3 -(b) also illustrates that eort of each employee are equal in the second period since the exogeneous value for the contest prize (v) is the same for both employees.
When employees' abilities are suciently dierent (σ < 0.36), a handicapping policy of favoring the loser h > 1 clearly raises the second period eort by both employees ( Figure  3-(b) ). Moreover, the rst period eort by the weaker employee A is greater than that of the stronger employee B (Figure 3-(a) ). This is because the potential eort loss in the rst period is mitigated by the indirect eect identied in Proposition 3. The decreased value of winning the rst period, or loser's bonus , has a strategic eect on employee B to reduce his eort. This reduction in eort from a restrained employee B causes employee A to increase his eort in the rst period. In other words, the change in the total rst period eort is ambiguous and small. This eect is oset by the overwhelming increase in eort in the second period.
On the other hand, when employees' abilities are quite similar (σ > 0.36) favoring the winner increases the rst period eort by raising the value of winning in the rst period for both employees (Figure 3-(a) ). While the strategic eect from an increased valuation of winning in the rst period is greater for stronger employee B (Proposition 2), the indirect 
Extensions

Commitment vs. Flexibility
In our main model, we assume that the manager credibly commits to a handicapping policy prior to the rst period contest.
13 While this seems reasonable since rms tend to operate in an environment with enforceable contracts with its employees, clients, and suppliers, an interesting issue is whether the rm prefers to commit to a handicapping policy. In particular, if the manager expects to receive more relevant information regarding the identities of employees (who the weaker and stronger employee is) during the rst period, eliminating all ex post possibilities through commitment seems unlikely to be a good idea. In these circumstances, the manager may value the exibility to act on this 13 This is a critical assumption since our main result of favoring the winner case in Proposition 4 only arises with commitment. Without commitment, the manager only maximizes the second period eorts and thus always favors the loser since favoring the weaker is optimal under uncertainty for a static case (see Proposition 1). Also, employees anticipate the manager will handicap the loser, and therefore, hide their types with less eort, resulting in a ratchet eect (Freixas et al. 1985) . Thus, we can further show that under uncertainty, the manager always prefer to commit to handicapping (details have been omitted for brevity but are available from the authors).
information and thus prefers not to commit to any specic handicapping policy ex ante.
To address this issue, we compare our main model of commitment with the following benchmark scenario of no commitment. In our main model of commitment, we assume the manager receives a noisy signal about who is the weaker employee by observing only the outcome of the rst period contest. In the benchmark case of no commitment, we assume that the manager perfectly learns the abilities of both employees at the end of the rst period through interactions with them during the rst period contest.
14 This set up serves to stack the deck against nding commitment-related benet since it assumes the best possible situation for no commitment (exibility) case; that is, the information that the manager can act on at the beginning of the second period is now perfect information. In reality, the information is far from perfect, which should lower the potential benet from the exibility. Hence, with this perfect information under no commitment case, one may wonder whether the manager still prefers to commit to a handicapping policy.
We rst note that under the no commitment situation, the manager chooses a policy h only after the rst period. If the manager knows employees' identities perfectly, she can achieve the rst-best outcome in the second period by favoring the weaker employee by exact amount of the ability dierence, h = 15 Thus, the rst period in the repeated contests reverts to the static contest result where total eort is equal to 2σv (σ+1) 2 . With perfect information, the total eort from both players in both periods is
where e T otal denotes the eort level under no commitment, which simplies to v when σ = 1.
We can easily see that the total eort under commitment is lower than that of no commitment (e T otal < e T otal ) over the range of asymmetry where favoring the loser is optimal (i.e., when employees are very dierent or σ is suciently low), since the second period eort is always higher under no commitment (e T otal 2 < e T otal 2 ), and the rst period 14 During the rst period contest, the manager often recieve signal about employee abilities other than their outcomes (which is also inuenced by external factors such as luck). Hence, the manager can sometimes precisely identify who the weaker or stronger employee is after the rst period.
15 Here, we are simply imposing the best possible situation for the no commitment case by assuming that the manager receives perfect information. This is done in order to illustrate the value of commitment for eliciting employees' eorts against the value of exibility. However, in practice, it is an important issue whether or how the manager can acquire the perfect information. For example, employees may strategically conceal their abilities to avoid ratcheting. Once one has a micro-model about interaction between the manager and employees during the contest, then one can analyze this dynamics of information revelation.
But this is beyond the scope of the current research. We thank an anonymos reviewer for suggesting this important issue.
eort is lower than in the static case under this handicapping policy (e T otal 1 < e T otal 1 since ω i ≤ v for all i = {A, B} from Proposition 2). Hence, the manager values the exibility more than commitment when employees are very dierent.
However, we nd that even if the manager can benet from exibility by obtaining the perfect information at the end of rst period, she prefers to commit to a handicapping policy of favoring the winner based on the rst period contest result when σ is suciently large or employees are quite similar.
Proposition 5 There exists a σ * such that for all σ ∈ [σ * , 1], the total eort under commitment of a handicapping policy of favoring the winner based on the rst period contest result is greater than no commitment case even with perfect information: e T otal > e T otal .
In spite of having perfect information about employees, the manager can be better o by forgoing this information and committing to the handicapping policy of favoring the winner when employees are quite similar. In this case, the employees' future consideration raises the rst period eort due to the handicapping policy of favoring the winner. This increase in the rst period eort can more than compensate the eort loss from the ineciency caused by using noisy information based on the rst period contest result (instead of using perfect information about employee types). For example, in the symmetric case of σ = 1, the optimal handicapping is h * = 1 3
, and the total eort is e T otal =
Proposition 5 highlights the value of a dynamic nature of handicapping policy; by dividing the contest into separate, but mutually dependant contests, a manager can increase total eort by committing to a handicapping policy above the level achieved from perfect information. Therefore, the eect of a handicapping policy is not merely shifting employee's eorts between two periods, but in fact increases the total eort level above the perfect information case due to employees' strategic behaviors arising from the dynamic relationship between two contests through a handicapping policy.
Promotion Accuracy
While maximizing eort is a common objective, in practice a manager might have several alternative objectives, such as accurately identifying the good employee in order to make promotion, transfer, or termination decisions. We can apply the current model to examine this important issue.
The contest design is still the same in that the handicapping policy is announced before the rst period contest and is applied to the second period contest. Depending on the handicapping policy, it is possible to have eort modication by both employees resulting in noisy outcomes in selecting the better employee.
We have shown that for h < 1 (favoring the winner policy), the value of the rst contest to the stronger employee B is higher than to the weaker employee A. As a result, B increases his eort more than A in order to achieve the future rewards of the current success, making it easier to win in the second period. This increased eort of the stronger employee also enhances his chances of winning the rst period contest. On the other hand, for h > 1 (favoring the loser policy), the weaker employee increases his rst period eort while the stronger employee decreases his eort, which makes it harder to identify the stronger employee. The second period outcome is more desirable in that h > 1 increases eort by both players. But this further increases the uncertainty in contest results and thus, makes it harder to identify the better employee.
In choosing the better employee for promotion, the manager can consider two possible promotion rules. The rst ruls is to choose the winner of the rst period contest while the second rule is to choose the winner of the second period contest. If the goal of the manager is to identify the more qualied employee, we can easily show that it is always optimal for the manager to adopt a handicapping policy of favoring the winner under both rules. Proposition 6 Under both promotion rules, a handicapping policy of favoring the winner is always optimal for identifying the stronger player for all σ ≤ 1. Moreover, the advantage of choosing the winner of the second period contest (Rule 2) dominates choosing the winner of the rst period contest (Rule 1)
When choosing the winner of either the rst period or second period contest as the standard for promotion, the probability of correctly identifying the better employee increases when a handicapping policy of favoring the winner is used. Although a handicapping policy of favoring the winner is always optimal, the nal outcome is still signicantly dierent between the two dierent promotion rules as seen in Figure 4 . The intuition behind the results is that the use of Rule 1 only captures the increased eorts of stronger employees, which increases his chance of winning the rst period contest. However, there is still some chance that he might also lose because of the stochasticity of the success function. Rule 2, on the other hand, allows for this possibility that a better employee may lose in the rst period. In this case, a stronger employee can still prove his ability by exerting more eort to win in the second period contest. If he wins the rst period contest, then it is even easier for him to win in the second period due to the winner's bonus. Hence, the promotion accuracy is always higher under Rule 2 than under Rule 1. This suggests an important managerial implication for the structure of job promotion: when a manager uses winning a contest as the standard for promotion, postponing the decision to the nal period has a higher accuracy than deciding in the earlier period. Hence, it is optimal to have at least one interim evaluation of employees before an organization makes major promotion or job assignment decision. we use a Tullock contest model and handicapping policy to address this issue. We show that by dividing the contest into separate, but mutually dependent contests, a manager can increase total eort by committing to a certain handicapping policy.
A conict arises, however, between favoring a poor performer or rewarding a top performer in a dynamic setting. Favoring the loser increases eort in the second period at the expense of reducing each employee's incentive to win the rst period due to the future punishment for the winner, and can be seen as the ratchet eect . Also, favoring the winner increases eort in the rst period because of the future reward for the winner, but would also create another type of incentive problem of moral hazard ; the winner no longer has to work as hard. The manager should weigh the trade-os of these two dierent policies (favoring the winner vs. favoring the loser) to maximize the employees' total eort.
We nd that if abilities are suciently similar, favoring the winner in the second period increases total eort over both periods rewarding the top performer is optimal. However, if abilities are suciently dierent, the opposite result holds, and total eort is maximized by adopting a handicap policy that favors the loser investing in laggards is optimal. As such, the model suggests a clear handicapping policy guideline for the manager when faced with a heterogeneous workforce with uncertain abilities in a dynamic contest environment.
Moreover, handicapping is common practice in various settings: from sports events (for example, golf and sailing) to social systems (such as armative actions).
16 This study 16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to think about broader implications of handicapping and suggesting these examples can broadly apply to those various settings and provide useful insight about what types of systems can help participants in those settings to put in their best eorts and increase the eciency of the system. Also, we show that a manager can increase total eort above the level achieved from perfect information by committing to a handicapping policy. This arises from employees' strategic behaviors due to the dynamic relationship between two contests through handicapping policy. Furthermore, this implies that even if the manager knew the ability of each employee, a handicapping policy of favoring the winner has a greater incentive eect than evening the contest by favoring the loser. This result uniquely contributes to the existing contest literature concerning maximizing eort and handicapping.
There are many other factors that aect the eectiveness of a handicapping policy such as fairness or prize structure. For instance, handicapping the weaker employee may cause the stronger employee to feel that the contest has been unfairly altered such that their work appears under-appreciated, which may eventually lead to disenchantment for the stronger player. This point is worth examining from a goal theory perspective, as do Murphy et al. (2004) . Our paper complements this goal theory perspective and contributes to understanding why favoring the loser could lower the eort from a stronger employee.
Yet the proposed model sometimes seems to favor the Matthew Eect, by which winners only win because they have won in the past, and not due to their superior ability (Merton 1968 ). We believe that our model can oer another explanation for the Matthew Eect.
Also, we have only examined a two-period repeated contest. A natural extension would involve a multi-period contest and it would be interesting to examine whether our main results can hold beyond two-periods. Unlike the two-period case where the handicapping policy is employed only once at the beginning of the second period, the manager can employ dierent handicapping policies for each period, and thus, the optimal handicapping prole would involve a series of dierent handicapping policies over entire periods, which is beyond the scope of our current work. We leave it for future research to explore this issue.
Finally, we only examine the two-employee case whereas other research has examined a much larger pool of participants, in which case the optimal proportion of winners in a contest can be an important issue (Lim 2010 ). However, if managers only have to distinguish between a pair of leaders, it might not be practical to include more than two agents in a competition, say for the same client account. Nevertheless, an application to the multiemployee case would broaden the implications of our study.
Given a handicapping policy h and uncertainty p, we can calculate the equilibrium eorts under handicapping from Equation (3). With probability 1 − p, employee A is (correctly) identied as the weaker employee and receives a handicap of h. Equilibrium levels of eort for both employees then are e t = e t A = e t B = σh (1+σh) 2 v. Since v A = v B = v, both employees exert the same amount of eort e t in equilibrium, where the superscript`t' represents their true' identity. But with probability p, employee A is identied (incorrectly) as the stronger employee, and the handicap is erroneously applied to the truly stronger employee B. The equilibrium levels of eort for both employees are e f = e 
The rst-order condition with respect to h yields:
It can be easily seen that Moreover, we can show that ∂E(e T otal ) ∂h > 0 for all h < 1.
1. When h ≤ σ(< 1), it is trivially satised.
2. When σ < h < 1, we show that
3 by rearranging the inequality
In the second inequality, as p ↓ 0, the (LHS) goes to innity, and thus, the inequality is always satised. More precisely, we can nd the condition such that when p < p,
In summary, when p < p, First, it is obvious that ω A = ω B = v when h = 1. Next, note that ω A = v+
Therefore, ω B − ω A > 0 if and only if h < 1 (note that σ < 1).
The results in the proposition follow.
Proof of Proposition 3:
From the rst order condition,
(σω A +ω B ) 3 .
1. Under a handicapping policy of favoring the loser, ω B < ω A < v . Hence, if σ <
2. Under a handicapping policy of favoring the winner, ω B > ω A > v. Thus,
(σω A +ω B ) 3 < 0 and First, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium of eorts by both employees for all σ and h. We have already established that the rst-and second-order conditions are satised, yielding existence of an equilibrium. Therefore, to prove uniqueness, we examine the Hessian of U A and U B , (19) which simplies to (20) since valuations are exogenous to eorts. If H is negative denite for all e A and e B , then the equilibrium is unique (Rosen 1965 ). This claim is easy to verify since the rst component is negative by assumption and the determinant
is positive denite, provided that
We have already established existence, so we can evaluate Equation (22) for each success function:
From Equation (7) 
Next, we show that the optimal handicapping policy is decreasing in σ. From Equation (16), we know that for a given σ, total eort is
where 
where By substituting these results, the rst-order condition of Equation (24) Using this, we can further simplify the rst-order condition and we dene the implicit function (F (h, σ)):
where X = h + σandY = 1 + σh.
We dierentiate F (h, σ) with respect to h, σ. After a few algebraic steps, we can see < 0. All we need to show is that when σ is large such that σ > σ, it is the case that h * < 1. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose that when σ is suciently large and the optimal handicapping policy is h * ≥ 1. Then, it must be the case that ∂E[e T otal ] ∂h (h = 1) > 0. However, we can easily see that ∂E e T otal (h = 1) ∂h = 2 1 + 5σ − 5σ 3 − 33σ 3 − 37σ 4 − 9σ 5 + 5σ 6 + σ 7 < 0, if σ > σ ≈ 0.38
This contradicts the assumption. Thus, when σ > σ, it is the case that h * < 1.
In particular, when σ = 1, E e T otal (h, σ = 1) = v(1+3h) (1+h) 2 > 1 from Equation (16) . Total eort is therefore maximized at h = 1/3.
Proof of Proposition 5:
We note that (1) e T otal < e T otal under a handicapping of favoring the loser region (i.e., σ is suciently small). Also, (2) when σ = 1, e T otal = 9 8 v > e T otal = v. Hence, if e T otal is monotonically increasing in σ, there must exist a σ * such that for all σ ∈ [σ * , 1], e T otal > e T otal from continuity. Therefore, all we need to show is that e T otal is monotonically increasing in σ over the range of asymmetry where the optimal handicapping policy is favoring the winner (where ω B > ω A ). Let σ be the cuto such that when σ > σ , favoring the winner is optimal.
First, it is easy to see that when σ > σ , In particular,
Let F (σ) = (1 − σh) (h + σ) 3 + 2hσ(1 − σ 2 ) 1 + σ(3h − h 3 + σ) − (σ − h) σ 2 (1 + σh) 3 .
Then,
We can see that when σ > σ = (σω A + ω B ) 2 > 0 (27) From (25) and (27) , e T otal is monotonically increasing in σ ( > 0). Hence, when σ is suciently large where a handicapping policy of favoring the winner is optimal, there must exist a σ * such that for all σ ∈ [σ * , 1], e T otal > e T otal .
There are two rules possible in choosing who the better employee is in the contest. We rst establish that favoring the winner of the rst period contest (h < 1) increases accuracy more than favoring the loser (h ≥ 1).
1. Rule 1: Choose the winner of the rst round.
Let ρ 1 be the probability of identifying the stronger employee B as the good employee using Rule 1. By this rule the probability the winner of the rst period contest is the stronger employee is ρ 1 = 1 − for all h > 1, then it is optimal to favor the winner under Rule 1.
Rule 2:
Choose the winner of the second round.
Let ρ 2 be the probability of identifying employee B as the good employee using Rule 2. By the this rule, the probability the winner of the second period contest is the good employee is ρ 2 = 1 − To show that when using this rule the probability of choosing the good employee is higher when h < 1, we have ρ 2 = 
since the optimal handicap is h < 1 for both rules. Hence, ρ 2 > ρ 1 for all σ ≤ 1
